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Can the welfare state justify restrictive asylum policies?  
A critical approach 
 
For liberal egalitarians, a generous welfare state and open asylum policies represent important 
values that states should seek to realise. What happens if they are incompatible? There are 
economic, social and political reasons for why they might be. Refugees may, for example, 
become an economic challenge to the welfare state. Or, increased diversity may erode national 
solidarity underpinning redistribution. If this is the case, can the welfare state justify restrictive 
asylum policies? 
Rather than providing a definite answer, in this paper I ask how political theorists should relate 
to the empirical concerns underpinning this question. My aim is to show that political theorists, 
whether they adopt an ideal or realist approach to the justificatory role of empirical facts in 
normative theorising, should seek to provide a critical description of the welfare state/asylum 
conflict. This entails analysing not only the politics and economics of contemporary welfare 
states and asylum policies, but the power structures, institutions and discourses that underpin 
the alleged conflict. It entails being aware of whose voices are heard and whose agency counts 
in political theorising on asylum and the welfare state. This way, normative answers to the 
question can better address the power structures and root causes of the conflict, rather than 
unwittingly reproducing them.  
To this end, I start by very briefly outlining the welfare state/asylum conflict. Next, I discuss 
realist and idealist approaches to such empirical constraints on asylum policies and propose a 
critical perspective. I then discuss two accounts of the welfare state/asylum conflict, one ideal 
and one realist, put forward by Matthew Gibney (2004) and Björn Östbring (2017). 
Throughout, I use Sweden as a case study: a progressive welfare state that has recently 
introduced several restrictions on asylum to protect the welfare state. Resistance against 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJULJKWVZLWKLQWKHZHOIDUHVWDWHWRSRVVLEO\H[SDQGWKHVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRDGPLW
refugees, has been a prominent argument among progressives favouring restrictive asylum 
policies. , DUJXH WKDW*LEQH\¶V DQG Östbring¶VQRUPDWLYH UHDVRQV IRU VHHNLQJ WRSURWHFW WKH
welfare state are appealing, and that if combined their ways of compensating against the claims 
of refugees are morally acceptable. Yet, the case of Sweden illustrates, several of the arguments 
in favour of protecting the welfare state weaken considerably once we view the conflict from 
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a more critical perspective. Such perspective reveals, for example, methodological nationalism 
in the description of citL]HQV¶PRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVWRZDUGVDV\OXPVHHNHUVDQGof the supposed 
need for national solidarity to support the welfare state. The consequence is normative 
recommendations biased towards WKHYRLFHVDQGDJHQF\RIWKHµPDMRULW\¶FLWL]HQRIQDWLRQDO
welfare states.  
The focus of this paper is on refugees, rather than on immigration in general. While there is 
some overlap, it is important to keep categories of migrants separated as we cannot assume that 
all movements across international borders raise the same moral issues. Throughout the paper, 
I assume that liberal democratic welfare states have extensive moral obligations to admit 
refugees (for various accounts of the moral bases of these obligations, see e.g. Gibney 2004; 
Owen 2016; Souter 2014).  
Welfare State Constraints on Refugee Admissions 
The welfare state may engender two main constraints on generous asylum policies. One is 
economic/organisational and one is social/political. Economic constraints refer to the economic 
sustainability of a particular welfare state model. In the short term, asylum seekers and refugees 
require housing, school places and often financial and legal assistance. The latter imposes 
mainly financial costs, but housing and school places pose logistical problems as well. There 
are only so many houses that can be built or so many teachers that can be recruited or trained 
in the short term. In the long term, refugees may become economic burdens on welfare states 
if they do not integrate on the labour market. $ VWXG\ RI 6ZHGHQ¶V UHIXJHe population 
demonstrates that most of the fiscal costs stem from lower labour market participation, rather 
than higher public spending costs (Ruist 2018). Finally, the egalitarian ethos of universal 
welfare states require that resources are redistributed non-selectively. Welfare dualism, where 
immigrants enjoy a fewer set of rights initially or indefinitely, undermines welfare 
universalism. But resisting welfare dualism can raise the costs of refugees, as they are 
immediately entitled to a wide set of social rights. Of course, these are not necessary effects 
and refugees bring many economic benefits ('¶$OEULVet al 2018). Yet it may also be the case 
that universal welfare states (with highly regulated labour markets) are specifically susceptible 
to higher costs.  
The social/political welfare state constraints on asylum policies concern the motivations of 
current citizens to support redistributive policies. The welfare state includes many benefits, but 
these are not equally distributed amongst the population. In particular, those who are well-off 
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seem to have fewer reasons based on self-interest to support social redistribution. To fill this 
motivational gap, nationalist scholars have suggested that citizens must regard themselves as a 
group of co-nationals. This way, the pull of an affective identity will motivate people to support 
redistribution even when this is not directly supported by self-interest (e.g. Miller and Ali 2015; 
Banting and Kymlicka 2017). The shared identity, it is claimed, elicits solidarity among 
compatriots. BXWWKLVVROLGDULW\LVQRZSUHPLVHGRQWKHERXQGHGQDWXUHRIWKHLPDJLQHGµXV¶
5HIXJHHVPD\XQGHUPLQHWKLVVHQVHRIVROLGDULW\E\EHLQJSHUFHLYHGDVµWKHRWKHU¶1  
Perhaps even more so in public than in scholarly debates, these kinds of empirical concerns, 
whether accurate or not, shape how we think about (the limits of) states obligations to refugees. 
This is clearly demonstrated in the case of Sweden.2 At the end of 2015, Sweden had received 
a record number of asylum seekers, prompting the Social Democratic-Green coalition 
government to introduce several restrictive measures to reduce the numbers. They claimed that 
basic social services could no longer cope. Initially seen as temporary measures, restrictive 
asylum policies have since become viewed as a prerequisite for the universal egalitarian 
welfare state. A controversial election poster from the Swedish Social Democrats in 2018 
depicted a border control police, captioned with DSURPLVHWRSURWHFWDQGGHYHORSµWKH6ZHGLVK
0RGHO¶DWHUPFRPPRQO\XVHGWRGHVFULEHWKHZHOIDUHVWDWH3 In a research interview, a Social 
Democratic representative agreed that protecting social and economic equality, and resisting 
welfare dualism, can be more important than generous asylum policies.4 The next section 
engages in a methodological debate on how empirical facts should be included in normative 
theory. I suggest that what matters more than whether one adopts an ideal or realist approach, 
is that a RQHDSSURDFKHVµUHDOLW\¶FULWLFDOO\ 
Realism or Idealism 
                                                 
1
 See Nils Holtug (2017) for an excellent analysis of this alleged relationship. 
2
 The focus here is on the welfare state as a reason for restricting asylum policies, which was a strong factor in 
bringing about the policy change. However, that was not the only reason why restrictions were implemented. It 
could be argued that an increasing threat from the extreme right was another reason; there is no room to assess 
the importance of these various reasons here.    
3
 To view the poster, visit for example: http://news.cision.com/se/socialdemokrater-for-tro-och-solidaritet/r/s-
kampanj-kritiseras-for-rasistiska-undertoner,c2369428 (Accessed 2018-07-31) 
4
 This was discussed in a research interview with a Swedish Social Democrat in 2018.  
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There is by now a familiar debate within political theory between so called realist and idealist 
approaches. There are many aspects of this debate, and many meanings to both realism and 
idealism. I specifically take issue with one central FODLPPDGHLQWKLVGHEDWHZKLFKERWKµVLGHV¶
tend to agree on. This is the idea that realism and idealism are both part of the same continuum 
± the more realist a theory, the more action-guiding. I suggest that theorists should pay more 
attention to how they describe reality, rather than assuming that one can easily move between 
UHDOLVW DQG LGHDOLVW SHUVSHFWLYHVE\ µDFFHSWLQJ¶PRUHRU OHVVRI UHDOLW\ Political theorists of 
migration have debated the role and accuracy of some of the empirical concerns outlined above 
(e.g. Pevnick 2009; Holtug 2017). However, few have engaged in a methodological discussion 
on how theorists should engage with the evidence presented by the social sciences, especially 
in a way that enables normative analysis of the power structures that underlie a conflict like 
the one between the welfare state and asylum policies. One notable exception is Alex Sager 
(2016; 2018) who has shown how the empirical assumptions of political theorists of migration 
are often tainted by methodological nationalism that masks power structures and skews 
QRUPDWLYHFRQFOXVLRQV+HDUJXHVWKDWµSROLWLFDOWKHRULVWVVKRXOGWXUQWRTXHVWLRQVRISRZHU
FDXVDOLW\ DQG UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ WR HQDEOH D µPRUHQXDQFHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPLJUDWLRQDQG LWV
PRUDOLPSOLFDWLRQV¶6DJHUIn this section, I emphasise how political theorists can 
answer the question of whether the welfare state can justify asylum restrictions only when they 
move beyond the µcontinuum view¶ of realism and idealism and adopt a critical perspective.  
First, we must distinguish between two strands of realism within political theory. Matt Sleat 
(2016) has described these as, on the one hand, conceptual realism, and, on the other hand, 
methodological realism. Methodological realism suggests that political theorists must 
incorporate facts about the social and political world, including contingent facts, into normative 
theorising (e.g. Miller 2013). The central concern is political feasibility of normative ideals. 
Idealism fails in this regard, methodological realists claim, because at best they accept hard, 
immutable facts about the world, but dismisses that which is contingent yet pervasive. Idealism, 
in contrast, aspires to be fact-insensitive, at least with regards to contingent facts about human 
behaviour and the social and political world (Estlund 2014). Conceptual realists take issue with 
µPRUDOLVP¶LQSROLWLFDOWKHRU\ZKLFKWKH\DOVRDVFULEHWRPHWKRGRORJLFDOUHDOists (Sleat 2016). 
7KH\VXJJHVWWKDWSROLWLFDOWKHRU\VKRXOGQRWEHDERXWµDSSOLHGHWKLFV¶EXWDERXWKRZOHJLWLPDWH
SROLWLFDO RUGHU FDQ EH HVWDEOLVKHG DQG PDLQWDLQHG JLYHQ WKDW SROLWLFV LV µD VLWH RI SHUSHWXDO
VWUXJJOHIRUSRZHUDQGGRPLQDQFH¶6OHDW: 31). They also take issue with the idealist claim 
that political principles should be judged according to whether they would be adopted in a 
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scenario of full compliance with principles of justice, arguing that this eradicates the political 
from sight.  
The differences between idealism and the two forms of realism, I want to suggest, is not as 
stark as portrayed, at least not in practice. Many differences, though not all, boil down to 
conflicting descriptions of reality. Bar perhaps Cohen (2003), few political theorists assume no 
contingent facts about the world. To get off the ground, theorists must assume some facts about 
the world and most of them tend to be contingent. This is certainly the case with both asylum 
seekers and the welfare state, both constructions of the modern nation-state system rather than 
µQDWXUDO¶SKHQRPHQDRIKXPDQH[LVWHQFH. Ideal theorists often assume more facts then they 
recognise, as Charles Mills (2005) has pointed out: tKHLUDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWXQLYHUVDORUµKDUG¶
facts about the world often turn out to reflect the world as viewed by the white, male, privileged 
gaze. Instead, much of the difference between conceptual realists, methodological realists and 
idealists, at least in relation to how empirical constraints such as those described above should 
be incorporated in normative theory, is not primarily whether facts should play a role, but what 
facts.  
To elaborate, there is a ubiquitous claim that the difference between (especially 
methodological) realism and idealism is that the former is more action-guiding than the latter. 
Idealism and realism are just two end-points on a continuum: 
On the one hand, the less real-world factual constraints are taken into account in 
the design of a normative political theory (which is meant to apply to the real 
world), the more practically ineffective its principles are likely to be (Valentini 
2012: 659).  
This continuum view is repeated frequently in the literature (Mason 2016; Carens 1996; 
Woodward 1992; Miller 2016b; 219). Theorists can choose where on the continuum to place 
themselves depending on how much they want to say about what should be done here and now. 
Discussing realist and idealist approaches to immigration, Joseph Carens (1996) makes this 
claim. He argues that in the short-term, political theories of immigration must take into account 
some realities to be action-JXLGLQJ7KHVHUHDOLWLHVLQFOXGHVWDWHV¶GLVFUHWLRQDU\ULJKWWRFRQWURO
their borders, that few countries are willing to accept significant numbers of refugees for 
UHVHWWOHPHQW WKH ULVN RI D µUDFLVW¶ EDFNODVK DJDLQVW JHQHURXV LPPLJUDWLRQ SROLFLHV QDWLRQDO
identities and resulting compatriot biases (Carens 1996: 159-162). Yet in the long-term, many 
of these assumptions are themselves unjustifiable and an idealist perspective is needed, Carens 
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suggests, to shed light on entrenched injustices. Accordingly, there is no principled difference 
between realist and idealist approaches, only different levels of concern with political 
feasibility. For Carens, what disrupts realist theory is the normative values we can abstract 
from ideal theory. What often needs disrupting, however, is the description of reality that 
underlies the realist approach. And such disruption may alter the recommended actions, rather 
than moving theory closer to a more abstract and unattainable ideal.  
Normative theories described as idealist often turn out not to be less concerned with facts, but 
concerned with different facts than the realist position. 7DNH IRU H[DPSOH &DUHQV¶V idealist 
(1987) argument for open borders. He relies on an analogy between the current state system 
and a feudal system. He claims that global injustices are perpetuated by state discretion over 
who to let in and that therefore, from a global justice perspectives, borders should be opened. 
A large part of the argument is a description of reality that highlights global structural 
injustices. If those injustices did not exist, this particular argument for open borders would not 
hold. Does this make the open borders argument realist by assuming contingent facts about the 
world? Compare the argument to David 0LOOHU¶V UHDOLVW YLHZ against open borders. At one 
point, Miller (2016a: 47-48) discusses the argument that open borders are necessary to achieve 
global equality of opportunity. He dismisses it based on the independence of states, arguing 
that in the absence of shared global institutions the principle of equality of opportunity only 
applies domestically. This assumption about the independence of states has been forcefully 
criticised as a case of methodological nationalism (Sager 2018). In the case of global injustices, 
and certainly many of the conflicts producing refugees today, arguably it is precisely 
interdependence, such as the legacy of colonialism and effects of global capitalism, that is the 
cause. So, who is more realist? The open borders argument that is based on an understanding 
RIWKHµUHDO¶FDXVHVRIJOREDOLQHTXDOLW\RUWKHRQHLQIDYRXURIVWDWHV¶ULJKWWRH[FOXGHWKDWLV
EDVHGRQDQµLGHDOLVHG¶YLHZRIstate independence? And, who is more action-guiding? If we 
want to tackle global inequalities, which view would prescribe the best policies, here and now? 
Perhaps open borders would not be beneficial to reducing global inequality, but the view that 
states are independent will surely not get us far either.  
This example highlights that the continuum view of realism/idealism misses an important 
aspect of normative theorising, namely a critical perspective on what facts that are being 
assumed. The continuum view leads us to ask how much of reality a theorist is assuming, rather 
than what kind of reality that is portrayed through a particular normative theory. This leads us 
away from a more critical engagement with descriptions of reality, even though this is often 
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what disagreement is about.5 No theorists can claim to have the superior or final description of 
reality, or to have chosen the optimal level of abstraction, or to have an epistemically neutral 
positionality. Yet a critical perspective is needed to emphasise, drawing on 5D\PRQG*HXVV¶ 
QRWLRQRIµthe entanglement between the normative and the descriSWLYHLQSROLWLFDOWKHRUL]LQJ¶
that one cannot choose whether to include a description of reality in political theory if one is 
to theorise about human societies at all, but that one can reflect on the description itself (Prinz 
2016: 789; see also Geuss 2008: 37-38). Without accepting any wider claims about the role of 
contextualisation and the possibilities of abstract normativity, the important point for our 
purposes is that: 
[political] theorists are advised to approach their surroundings with suspicion, to 
be wary of what is alleged to be actual and to inquire into how this has come to be 
viewed as actual (Prinz 2016: 785). 
A central concern is the role of power; how it shapes the µUHDOLW\¶WKHRULVWVPXVWUHODWHWR, but 
also how it shapes who becomes heard through the writing of the political theorist. The 
LPSRUWDQFHRILQTXLULQJLQWRµWKHSURGXFWLRQRINQRZOHGJH¶in political theory is stressed by 
Sager (2018: 69)ZKRLVSURSRVLQJDµFULWLFDOFRVPRSROLWDQDSSURDFKWRPRELOLW\¶ that seeks to 
µcontest relationships of domination and hierarchy¶.6 A critical approach also draws on work 
by Critical Border Studies, which focus on how bordering practices control mobility, construct 
identities and social and political relations (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012: 729), not least 
through the welfare state (Guentner et al 2017). A critical perspective, finally, adopts a 
broadened understanding of the political, looking especially at how discourses and epistemic 
biases condition what is politically feasible and what is viewed as acceptable knowledge in 
public debates (cf. Mills 2017: 49-71). Turning now to the specific question of refugees and 
the welfare state, I ask how a critical perspective change how we normatively address the 
proposed conflict.   
Protecting the Welfare State 
                                                 
5
 Another example of how the difference between the realist and idealist approaches often amount to disagreement 
about descriptions of reality, is the conceptual realist view of politics as inherently and primarily conflictual, 
leading to their normative recommendation to make order and stability overriding values. This has been criticised 
by Miller (2016c), a methodological realist, for exaggerating the level of disagreement in many modern societies, 
putting forward a reductive account of politics and human motivation as always pulling towards conflict. 
6
 See also a discussion by Mihaela Mihai (unpublished manuscript). 
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Most political theories of migration have focused on a possible conflict between immigration 
and domestic social justice, but there are a few, both realist and idealist, that specifically discuss 
when trade-offs between asylum and the welfare state may be permissible. This section draws 
out how these accounts, as presented by Björn Östbring (2017) and Matthew Gibney (2004), 
conceptualise the normative value of the welfare state compared to the rights of refugees, from 
realist and idealist perspectives. I argue that they present some cogent arguments in favour of 
protecting the welfare state. However, as the following section will demonstrate, they also 
ultimately reproduce structures and discourses of dominance that may not only be unjust, but 
counter-productive to maintaining the social bases for the welfare state.  
First, however, we must ask at what point, if any, the welfare state is threatened by the effects 
of refugee admissions? This depends, firstly, on what kind of welfare state we would like to 
preserve. As I indicated at the start, a more universal welfare state, where differentiated rights 
undermine the basic model, with a heavily regulated labour market, may be more vulnerable 
to the admission of refugees, if their composition is significantly different to the overall 
population in terms of skills. If we follow Östbring and Gibney, who maintain, respectively, 
that the welfare state is fundamentally important as a social and political order and to protect 
the partial moral experience of humans, then there is no particular welfare state design that 
needs to be protected. Rather, a level of stability is required, whatever the welfare model, so 
WKDWH[SHFWDWLRQVVWHPPLQJIURPZHOIDUHLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWSHRSOH¶VOLYHVDnd relationships rely 
on are not suddenly overturned.  
Nonetheless, potential indicators of welfare state decline may include; reduction of generalised 
trust and trust in institutions; reduction in support for the welfare state; decreased willingness 
to comply with the welfare state, such as by paying taxes; increasingly overstretched social 
services, health care and schools with resultant increased crime, poverty, mortality and school 
drop-out rates, as well as increased inequality. Of course, most of these indicators will have 
nothing to do with refugees. To the contrary, in many countries immigration is necessary to 
secure the functions of the welfare state. The example of Sweden shows a somewhat different 
picture, however. Whilst the economy is strong, recent large number of asylum applications 
have put some strain on welfare services (SOU 2017:12). The cost of refugee admissions is, by 
recent calculations, lower than many assume, but compared to the rest of the population, 
unemployment among refugees is very high (Ruist 2018). Moreover, a very large proportion 
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of pupils in immigrant-dense7 areas graduate without basic qualifications.8 In the Swedish case, 
therefore, there may indeed be some cause for concern of the long-term consequences for the 
welfare state of extensive refugee admissions. This may partly be due to the specific universal 
nature of the Swedish welfare state (although it is worth noting that many benefits in Sweden 
are contribution based and thus, in practice, differentiated). It has been argued that it is the 
strongly regulated labour market (part of this particular model of welfare capitalism) that 
hinders low-skilled refugees from getting jobs, though this is disputed among economists (e.g. 
Bergh 2014; Hållo 2016). In any case, as long as reforms are not too drastic, welfare state 
stability can be preserved meanwhile the welfare state model is transformed to one that can 
more easily absorb a larger number of refugees.  
Yet why should we care about any potential effects on the welfare state, good or bad, in the 
IDFHRIUHIXJHHV¶ULJKWV":KDWLVWKHYDOXHRIWKHZHOIDUHVWDWHWKDWLVZRUWKSURWHFWLQJ"Östbring 
(2017), who also writes about the Swedish case, maintains from a realist (both conceptual and 
methodological) perspective the importance of social order to prevent the evils resulting from 
human conflict and disagreement. The welfare state, he suggests, is a form of social and 
political order. Once the welfare state is in place, he points out, it creates pervasive dependency 
on the benefits and services that the welfare state provides, and not just among the least well-
off. This deep dependency means that the welfare state becomes an encompassing social and 
political order. Without it, most people¶V lives in welfare states would not function. Its demise 
would have far reaching, unpredictable and hugely destabilising consequences. This argument 
is appealing because the dependence on the welfare state of most people in liberal democracies, 
and the expectations that this creates, is hard to deny. As opposed to other similar accounts 
(e.g. Woodward 1992), Östbring advances this as a historical and political argument, rather 
than a moral one. His main concern is not whether the expectations of citizens are just/ideal or 
not, but what they mean for the maintenance of social and political order.  
It is possible to disagree that maintaining order is the trumping value of politics, yet accept that 
asylum policies can be restricted when some functions of the welfare state are threatened with 
collapse. David Owen (2016), for example, holds that refugee admissions can be limited if 
there is a risk to the provision of basic rights of those already living in that state. Carens (1992: 
                                                 
7
 :KLOVW,UHIHUWRWKHVHDUHDVDµLPPLJUDQW-GHQVH¶WKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHLPPLJUDQWVWHQGVWREHGRPLQDWHG by 
refugees or the relatives of refugees.   
8
 https://www.sydsvenskan.se/2018-06-03/over-halften-klarar-inte-skolan-i-utsatta-omraden  
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33) likewise identifies that states are not obliged to admit refugees if such admittance would 
µ>GHVWUR\@ the capacity of the society to provide basic services to its PHPEHUV¶ In modern 
liberal states, the welfare state is the institution that secures the provision of basic rights and 
services. If one is concerned about the provision of basic rights and services, one ought to be 
concerned with the long-term sustainability of the welfare state. Rather than drawing the 
ultimate limit at the point where the state can no longer provide for basic rights, Östbring 
demonstrates that we have good reason to draw the limit at the point where the welfare state, 
i.e. a more expansive provision of basic and non-basic rights and services, becomes 
destabilised. (A similar view is taken by Gibney (2004: 227) when he moves from ideal to non-
ideal theory.) This is because the everyday, deep dependence on the welfare state of citizens 
makes it a powerful source of order and stability. This stability seems likely to be seriously 
undermined well before the state has reached the point where basic rights can no longer be 
provided. Thus, before embarking on a more critical analysis, as the section does, a realist 
account of the value of the welfare state provides some reason to protect it, perhaps even against 
the claims of refugees.  
Before embarking on the critical critique, how does an ideal theory conceptualise the value of 
the welfare state in contrast to the claims of refugees? On the second account discussed here, 
Gibney (2004) constructs an ideal theory of asylum oblLJDWLRQVGUDZLQJRQ7KRPDV1DJHO¶V
µGLYLGHG¶DFFRXQWRILPSDUWLDODQGSDUWLDOPRUDOREOLJDWLRQV2QWKLVYLHZLPSDUWLDODQG
partial moral obligations, i.e. those that we have towards all humans contra those that we have 
towards a special subset of all humans or to ourselves, cannot be ordered into a hierarchy where 
one always takes precedence. Instead, they both represent valid sources of moral obligations 
DQGPXVWEHEDODQFHG3DUWLDOREOLJDWLRQVRUµSHUVRQDOPRUDOLW\¶FDUU\LQGHSHQGHQWQRUPDWLYH 
weight because they represent an important aspect of the human moral experience (Gibney 
6SHFLDOFRPPLWPHQWV*LEQH\LQVLVWVµPDNHXVWKHGLVWLQFWLQGLYLGXDOV
ZHDUH¶7KHUHLVDOLPLWWRWKHVDFULILFHVZHFDQEHDVNHGWRPDNHRQWKH basis of impartial 
FRPPLWPHQWVEHFDXVHZHFDQQRWLJQRUHWKHµSUHVVLQJDWWDFKPHQWZHHDFKKDYHWRRXURZQ
SURMHFWV DQG WR WKHSDUWLFXODURWKHUV LQRXU OLYHV¶ *LEQH\ To always favour the 
impartial moral view is to ignore an important aspect of what it is like to be human. On this 
basis, Gibney argues that the welfare state, consequently constitutive of partial commitments 
IROORZLQJ *LEQH\¶V UHDVRQLQJ, can justify some restrictions on asylum policies of liberal 
democratic states: 
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To demand that a (Western) state show equal concern and respect to those beyond 
the state is to ask it to pursue policies that in all likelihood would undermine those 
practices and institutions that make for a semblance of equality and social justice 
within WKHVWDWH>«@ 
He goes on to argue that states should be allowed to restrict entry to protect not just basic liberal 
ULJKWVEXWDOVRDµJHQHURXV¶ZHOIDUHVWDWHWKDWFDQVHFXUHGRPHVWLFHFRQRPLFMXVWLFH (2004: 83).  
7RVHHZK\*LEQH\¶Vincorporation of partial morality into a theory of asylum has some merit 
HYHQ LQ µLGHDO¶ WKHRULVLQJ LW KHOSV WR FRPSDUH KLV DUJXPHQW WR DQRWKHU ideal account of 
migration. &KULV %HUWUDP  XVHV 5DZOV¶V RULJLQDO SRVLWLRQ WR GHWHUPLQH ZKDW JOREDO
system of migration would be justified to all humans from an impartial standpoint. He deprives 
the parties in the original position of much personal knowledge, such as their nationality, 
SUHIHUHQFHVDQGDWWDFKPHQWVEXWSURYLGHVWKHPZLWKNQRZOHGJHRIµWKLQJVWKDWDUHHVVHQWLDO
SUHUHTXLVLWHVIRUOLYLQJDGHFHQWOLIH¶%HUWUDP'LVFXVVLQJKRZWKHVHSDUWLHVZRXOG
reason about different migration systems, he dismisses that WKH\ZRXOG FKRRVHD µPRGLILHG
VWDWXVTXR¶ in which states remain the main actors, with a right to exclude immigrants but with 
responsibilities to people beyond their state as well. The reason for this dismissal is that such 
system relies on the methodologiFDOO\QDWLRQDOLVWDVVXPSWLRQRIVWDWHVDVµFRQWDLQHUV¶LJQRULQJ
interactions between states and especially the voices unrepresented or marginalised by states 
(Bertram 2018: 65). This is an important objection to much theorising about migration. Yet 
one ma\ZRQGHUZK\WKLVIDFWDERXWWKHµDFWXDOZRUOG¶± the inaccuracy of the container view 
± should be included in the original position while partial moral attachments and preferences 
should not? In the actual world, which Bertram is concerned with when criticising 
methodological nationalism, these attachments are very strong indeed and, along the lines of 
Gibney, one may suggest that they are a prerequisite of a decent life. Indeed, Bertram (2018: 
75) does allow for the preservation of cultural integrity to play some role in justifying 
restrictions on movements.  
Cultural or national identity are not, however, the only or necessarily the most important forms 
of partial attachments. Rather, the central point is how the welfare state is integral to most 
SHRSOH¶V OLIHSODQVDWWDFKPHQWVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV7RIROORZ*LEQH\¶VDUJXPHQWEHFDXVHWKH
welfare state is such a dominant factor in conditioning our existence, indeed it shapes our very 
attachments and interests, its preservation is important for maintaining the personal interests 
WKDWPDNHXVZKRZHDUH:LWKRXWLWPRVWSHRSOH¶VOLYHVZRXOGEHFRPHXQUHFRJQLVDEOH7KLV
is undesirable not only from the point of view of basic rights, but given the partial, or personal, 
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experience of human morality. The comparison to Bertram demonstrates that once ideal 
WKHRULVLQJWDNHVDPRUHFULWLFDODSSURDFKWRDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHµUHDO¶ZRUOGWKHDVVXPSWLRQ
that only impartial morality has normative value may also be questioned. The task for a more 
critical approach, discussed further below, is not to determine what is contingent and what is 
not, but rather what is fundamental to human well-being and what is underpinning injustices. 
Insofar as the welfare state is essential for the former, some restrictions to asylum policies may 
be justified. 
Yet fundamental questions remain about when concerns for a specific welfare state can permit 
restrictive asylum policies, and who is entitled to make such a judgement. 2Q*LEQH\¶V
242) account, when he moves to the non-ideal, states can judge for themselves. However, states 
also have a duty to alter the (political) constraints that limit their capacities (Gibney 2004: 244). 
To Östbring (2017: 115), what matters is what the alternatives for refugees are. Arguably, these 
two proposals must be combined if asylum restrictions based on welfare concerns are ever to 
be justified. The alternatives to refugees must be acceptable and states must aim to mitigate 
the constraints on further refugee admissions.9 I have argued for a similar approach elsewhere 
(Author 2017), albeit with a much more expansive concept of what constitutes acceptable 
alternatives for refugees than Östbring¶V, who seems to be content with a minimalist concept 
not including membership in a new state. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
acceptable alternatives in more detail. Instead, what is important for my purposes is the 
descriptive analysis of the constraints themselves. Mitigation of empirical constraints, for 
example, can only be effective if root causes and existing power structures are challenged. Yet 
theories describing the welfare state/asylum conflict tend instead to reproduce structures and 
discourses of dominance. Consequently, the action-guiding normative recommendations end 
up not being too abstract or too idealistic, QRWWRRGHYRLGRIµUHDOLW\¶ but based on an uncritical 
YLHZRIµUHDOLW\¶ 
A Critical Perspective 
                                                 
9
 Arguably, the Swedish state has failed on both these accounts when implementing recent asylum restrictions. 
Given the absence of a global or regional responsibility-sharing refugee scheme, there are no acceptable 
alternatives for refugees who would otherwise have found asylum in Sweden. And the Social Democrats initially 
MXVWLILHGUHVWULFWLRQVE\FODLPLQJWKDWWKH\ZRXOGEHXVHGWRLQFUHDVH6ZHGHQ¶VORQJ-term asylum capacity, they 
now seek to make the restrictions permanent.  
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In this final section, I assess the Swedish case to consider some of the arguments made by 
Gibney and Östbring from a critical perspective. So far, I have contended that the welfare state 
DV D VRXUFH RI VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO RUGHU DV ZHOO DV D IRXQGDWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SHUVRQDO
attachments and projects, provide us with good reasons to be concerned with its long-term 
sustainability. To justify restrictive asylum policies, however, I have suggested along Gibney 
and Östbring, that in addition to ensuring acceptable alternatives for refugees, states must aim 
to mitigate or challenge the causes of the welfare state/asylum conflict. To this end, a critical 
analysis of such causes is necessary.  
First, consider the implication of *LEQH\¶VDUJXPHQW, that the welfare state is important from 
the persSHFWLYH RI µpartial PRUDOLW\¶, while the claims of asylum-seekers are important for 
µLPSDUWLDOPRUDOLW\¶. When we consider the citizens of refugee-hosting (welfare) states, many 
RI ZKRP VKHOWHU UHIXJHHV YROXQWHHU WR DLG UHIXJHHV RU FDPSDLJQ IRU UHIXJHHV¶ rights, the 
distinction becomes blurred. During the refugee crisis of 2015, for example, thousands of 
unaccompanied minors, mainly boys from Afghanistan, applied for asylum in Sweden. Their 
fate rose to the top of the political agenda in 2018, as parliament voted to allow some (around 
9000) to stay if they continue their studies, despite that their asylum claim has been denied and 
that they have turned 18 during the process. Those against argued that these particular asylum-
seekers put too much strain on the welfare state, thus a claim for citizen-partiality. Yet many 
Swedish citizens had come to care deeply for these young men. Some of the host families even 
refer to the Afghans as their children, offering to take their place and be sent to Afghanistan 
themselves.10 Thus, given the diverse interests and attachments of citizens, it is a mistake to 
portray asylum policy as one of impartial morality, against the partial morality of the welfare 
state.  
,WPD\EHDUJXHGWKDWFLWL]HQV¶SHUVRQDODWWDFKPHQWVWRVSHFLILFUHIXJHHVVKRXOGQRWGHWHUPLQH
D VWDWH¶V DV\OXP SROLFLHV OHW DORQH WKH ULJKWV RI UHIXJHHV Yet if the partial interests and 
attachments of citizens are to carry moral weight in determining the relative importance of the 
welfare state, then we must at least consider the citizenry as a whole (even if we were willing 
to exclude the partial interests of refugees). The assumption that issues of asylum are about 
impartial obligations contra the partial interests of citizens privileges an understanding of 
UHIXJHHV DV DQ XQNQRZQ µPDVV¶ RU µIORRG¶ µIORZ¶ µZDYH¶ FRPSDUHG WR the presumed 
familiarity of co-FLWL]HQV%HUWUDP¶VFULWLTXHRIPHWKRGRORJLFDOQDWLRQDOLVPLVRQ
                                                 
10
 https://www.expressen.se/gt/min-son-riskerar-att-dodas-med-en-penna/  
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point when he highlights how it privileges µWKHYRLFHVWKDWJHWKHDUGZLWKLQVWDWHVWKHVROLG
FLWL]HQIURPWKHGRPLQDQWHWKQLFLW\WKHPHGLDQYRWHU¶%HUWUDP Sarah Fine (2017) 
has similarly pointed out the diversity of interests and relationship of citizens. Many citizens 
may have strong transnational connections, while perceiving their co-FLWL]HQVDV µVWUDQJHUV¶
(Fine 2017: 732). Indeed, it is not so clear that the welfare state is best described as an 
expression of partial moral commitments towards a collective, even though I maintain that it is 
a foundation of our personal attachments and projects. Such description only makes sense if 
we already assume the nation-state view of a special relationship between compatriots who 
share a national identity. And yet, not only may the welfare state itself create such sense of 
national identification by institutionalising certain group boundaries, many citizens may 
understand their contributions to the welfare state as contributions to the welfare of strangers. 
The view that asylum is about impartiality and the welfare state about partiality may therefore 
perpetuate power structures that give voice to the µPDMRULW\¶ citizen, imagined as feeling a 
special bond with their co-nationals and lacking transnational or trans-cultural ties.  
Second, both accounts discussed above rely on the claim outlined at the start, that diversity 
undermines social solidarity; by now a common objection to extensive immigration in general 
(e.g. Miller 2016a; Banting and Kymlicka 2017). Gibney, for example, does not allow asylum 
restrictions based on the moral claim to preserve a cultural identity, but argues that 
µUHSURGXFLQJSHRSOHVZLWKDFRPPRQLGHQWLW\¶LVRIµVWUDWHJLFLPSRUWDQFH¶DVLWIRUPVWKHVRFLDO
basis of social solidarity in the welfare state (Gibney 2004: 84). The evidence of a positive 
effect of national identity on social solidarity is, at best, mixed (e.g. Johnston et al 2010; Hall 
2017), while it is clearer that many people prefer to redistribute amongst people who they 
identify with (e.g. Ford 2016; Gilens 1996). Unless one views the categorisation of people in 
ethnic, cultural or national identity groups as primordial, however, this research literature does 
not demonstrate that cultural diversity per se is a problem, but that racism or ethnocentric bias 
is. In other words, preferences for in-group redistribution, which undermine support for 
redistribution to refugees and welfare universalism, rely on the existence of in-group and out-
group categorisations that map on to co-nationals and refugees. What is interesting from a 
critical perspective is how those categorisations are constructed and maintained.  
In the Swedish case, ethnocentric bias in redistributive attitudes can be linked to the 
development of the welfare state itself and the way it is entangled with nationalist discourse. 
At least two different forms of, concomitantly existing, nationalism have characterised Sweden 
in the past two centuries. Both can be understood in relation to the welfare state. First, up until 
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at least World War Two, a close link was made between the ethnically homogenous nation and 
the welfare state (Borevi 2017). Most infamously, this took its form of state-sponsored 
eugenics research. Discrimination and state violence against the Roma minority was one result, 
most infamously through forced sterilisation, but also through for example a ban on Roma 
immigration (DO 2004). Moreover, there is a trajectory in Sweden of restricting refugee 
admissions to protect the welfare state. Mirroring the contemporary debate on refugees as a 
welfare state burden, restrictive refugee measures at the end of the 1980s were claimed to be 
necessary to protect the welfare state (Hinnfors et al 2012). The premise of the national welfare 
VWDWHKDVDOZD\VEHHQWKHULJKWWRYLROHQWO\H[FOXGHµWKHRWKHU¶ both internally and externally, 
constructing and upholding in-group and out-group categorisations.  
The other form of Swedish nationalism is a paradoxical way of denying cultural difference 
while pursuing homogenising egalitarian norms through the welfare state. Despite supposedly 
pioneering state multiculturalism from the 1970s to the 1990s (Borevi 2017), Sweden has never 
embraced the notion that the (welfare) state can treat groups of individuals differently, or that 
ethnic or other group loyalties can be positive (Johansson Heinö 2012). Contemporary Swedish 
nationalism is characterised by the denial of cultural particularity (Towns 2002), also a 
common complaint amongst proponents of nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th century. 
At least since the 1960s µ6ZHGHQZDVXQGHUVWRRGDVDPRGHUQIRUZDUG-looking country in no 
need of traditions or symEROV¶-RKDQVVRQ+HLQ| 2009: 305). This nationalism views the state 
as emancipator; the state secures the freedom of the individual who, because she is protected 
by the welfare state, does not need to rely on any other form of collective, such as the family, 
clan, cultural group and so forth (Trädgårdh and Berggren 2006). Consequently, Swedes are 
not viewed as culturally different from others, but rather as more modern and further along a 
civilisation process ± as more advanced. Refugees are not different, but more backwards, more 
tied to their cultural practices. The welfare state is viewed as an effective remedy to such 
backwardnessDVLWFDQPRGHUQLVHFLYLOLVHDQGOLEHUDWHWKRVHVWLOOµVWXFN¶LQWKHFROOHFWLYHDQG
culturally specific.  
The result is sometimes intolerance against cultural difference, such as strong opposition to 
faith schools and Muslim headscarves, as well as epistemic ethnocentric biases. Ethnic Swedes 
are seen to possess a privileged epistemic position by virtue of their superior unencumbered 
rationality, compared to the culturally constrained refugee. This is channelled through the 
welfare state, which is tasked with enlightening the refugee. For example, the Liberal Party has 
recently proposed to make nursery compulsory for refugee children to promote language 
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learning, as well as the integration of women who would no longer be at home full-time, 
LPSO\LQJDµOLEHUDWLRQ¶RIUHIXJHHZRPHQWKURXJKWKHir involuntary incorporation in the welfare 
state.11 And the Social Democrats have pledged to ban faith schools, often (wrongly) imagined 
mainly as Muslim schools, arguing that µUHOLJLRXV LQIOXHQFLQJ¶ LV QRW FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK µWKH
6ZHGLVKPRGHO¶12 7KHLPSOLFDWLRQLVWKDWRQO\WKHFKLOGZKRJRWKURXJKWKHµQHXWUDO¶6ZHGLVK
state school system (of course strongly influenced by Christian traditions) can be truly free. 
These examples illustrate how the Swedish nationalism that emphasises Sweden as more 
civilised constructs in-group and out-group categories, partly through the (coercive) welfare 
state.  
This reading of the Swedish case suggests that (some of) its basis for national belonging and 
solidarity breeds intolerance and prejudice, and creates a discursive categorisation that 
reinforces refugees as a different social, political and epistemic category. These discourses are 
institutionalised through the welfare state. To overcome ethnocentric bias in redistributive 
attitudes, the welfare state and discourses on national belonging need to be reformed. And yet, 
to the contrary, the recent restrictions on asylum, and the political discourse that has followed, 
have reinforced the social imagination of difference between citizens and refugees (Hjerm et 
al 2017). This was not least exemplified with the Social Democratic election poster directly 
positing asylum seekers as a threat to the welfare state.  
Third, and relatedly, the argument that the welfare state must be tied to a sense of national 
belonging is marred by a methodological nationalism that privileges the nation over other 
forms of belonging. In the Swedish case, the liberal nationalist argument that economic 
insecurity gives rise to a need for national belonging masks a sedentarism bias highlighted by 
critical accounts of methodological nationalism (Sager 2016; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
2003). It masks that one of the most prominent responses to economic insecurity in Sweden in 
the past two centuries has been mobility, both domestic (as in most states, through urbanisation) 
and international. Between 1850 and 1930, 1.5 million Swedes emigrated to North America, 
due to poor economic conditions and an agricultural crisis (SCB 2004). How does this fact of 
mass mobility as a central part of recent Swedish history fit the nationalist description of a 
sedentary population, contained within a nation state, that must be protected against similar 
mobility of outsiders? In the national debate that followed mass emigration, the migrants were 
                                                 
11
 https://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/l-vill-ha-obligatorisk-forskola-for-nyanlanda/  
12
 https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/aktuellt/2018/forbud-mot-religiosa-friskolor/  
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often described as having abandoned theLU µIDWKHUODQG¶ and some blamed the exodus on a 
general lack of patriotism (Sundbärg 1911; Arnold Barton 1994). Economic and political 
inequality ZHUHDOVRVWUHVVHGDVµSXVK-IDFWRUV¶, which were compared to the perceived equality 
of America and lead to recommendations of democratisation and improved economic 
conditions to stem emigration (Sundbärg 1913).13 Perhaps this alleged lack RIµQDWLRQDOIHHOLQJ¶
was a prerequisite for an emigration that spurred the development of a more democratic and 
egalitarian society, paving the way for the welfare state. If this is correct, and of course the 
analysis here is far too limited to ascertain this properly, then restricting asylum to protect a 
sense of belonging that is based on nationalism and sedentarism is not necessary to maintain 
social and political order as such, only the social and political order that privileges the 
nationalist, sedentary subject ahead of the mobile and the transnational.  
Finally, in assessing the case for asylum restrictions to protect the Swedish welfare state, a 
critical approach urges us to consider whose voices and agency are being represented. In the 
accounts discussed above, the authors spend considerable time discussing the nature of the 
state, the welfare state and its citizens. The aims and motivations of refugees are only 
mentioned in passing. Gibney (2004) mentions that the aims of asylum seekers are important 
to motivate citizens to behave solidaristically (213), as well as the motivations of migrants who 
are not refugees but who may use asylum routes to escape poverty (259). Östbring (2017: X) 
briefly considers some alternatives to asylum in Western states like Sweden, without discussing 
how these alternatives my square with the aims and motivations of refugees. Östbring also 
assumes that if Sweden puts barriers to asylum on its territory, nothing bad will happen to 
refugees. This assumption is only plausible if one thinks that refugees will just stay put, rather 
than trying to seek a better existence despite increasing obstacles to doing so.14 
The privileged political position of the (contributing and welfare receiving) citizen in Sweden 
is also evident in recent political debate on the fate of the 9000 Afghan teenagers discussed 
above. The teenagers have campaigned relentlessly to get to stay, gaining a lot of attention and 
support, eventually leading to the law being adopted in 2018 that opened the possibility for 
                                                 
13
 For a postcolonial critique of the Swedish welfare state and how views on inequality inspired by America 
neglected racial and colonial inequalities, see Bhambra and Holmwood (2018).  
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 ,WLVDOVRRQO\SODXVLEOHLIRQHDVVXPHVWKHµFRQWDLQHUYLHZ¶ZKHUHE\VWDWHV¶SROLFLHVGRQRWDIIHFWWKRVHRIRWKHU
VWDWHV7KLVQHJOHFWVKRZPRVWVWDWHVSDUWDNHLQDµUDFHWRWKHERWWRP¶LQDV\OXPSROLFLHVSXVKLQJUHIXJHHVFORVHU
and closer to conflict areas.  
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their cases to be re-considered. One particular critique voiced by those against the new law is 
that it will undermine the rule of law. They argue that asylum cases should be determined by 
law, not politics, and not by who is able to make their voices heard.15 Yet, of course, asylum 
laws are political and do depend on whose voices are heard. The restrictions on asylum that 
were implemented in Sweden in 2015/2016 were a direct result of local councils complaining 
that they were not able to cope with the high numbers anymore, and the fact that these 
restrictions are becoming increasingly permanent are a result of the successful campaigning by 
citizens and politicians who are keen to protect the welfare state. If anyone has the power to 
politically impact asylum policies, it is those citizens partaking in the redistributive community 
and who on that basis has what many view as, from the nation-state perspective, the only 
legitimate voice in the politics of asylum. These uneven power structures, whereby 
membership in the national welfare state provides one with the ability to determine the extent 
to which UHIXJHHV¶ rights should be respected or sacrificed, are reinforced through theorising 
that neglects the aims, motivations and voices of refugees yet insists that those of citizens act 
as feasibility constraints on the policies that can be implemented.  
What these examples from Sweden have sought to illustrate is that whether the welfare state, 
as a social and political order, or an institutionalisation of the personal moral experience, can 
MXVWLI\ DV\OXP UHVWULFWLRQVGHSHQGRQKRZZHGHVFULEH WKH µUHDOLW\¶ WKDW PD\PDNH UHIXJHH
admissions conflict with the welfare state. While at a first glance, the economic and 
organisational pressures asylum-seekers have imposed on the Swedish welfare state may affect 
its long-term sustainability, it is also the case that restricting asylum would perpetuate dominant 
power structures and in-group biases that can cause the social and political aspect of the welfare 
state/refugee conflict. This is at least so if restrictions are justified by the need for national 
belonging or a need to protect the partial moral commitments constitutive of the welfare state. 
Moreover, if states are to mitigate the empirical constraints on more generous asylum policies, 
a condition on the permissibility on restricting policies to protect the welfare state, they must 
address some deep-URRWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRQQDWLRQDOEHORQJLQJ WKH µFLYLOLVLQJ¶ UROHRI WKH
welfare state and the political subjects involved in determining asylum policies. Thus, the 
question of whether the welfare state can justify asylum restrictions does not depend on 
                                                 
15http://www.hallandsposten.se/%C3%A5sikter/ledare/debatten-ska-inte-avg%C3%B6ra-vem-som-f%C3%A5r-
stanna-1.4782250  
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ZKHWKHU RQH µDFFHSWV¶ PRUH RU OHVV RI µUHDOLW\¶ DV WKH FRQWLQXXP YLHZ RQ Solitical theory 
suggests, but on how reality is described.  
Conclusion 
I have sought to problematise the conflict between refugees and the welfare state by discussing 
how theorists approach the empirical concerns underpinning it. I have stressed the need for a 
FULWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHRIKRZUHDOLW\LVGHVFULEHGPRYLQJEH\RQGWKHµFRQWLQXXPYLHZ¶ZKHUHE\
the theorist can simply choose how much of reality to include in normative analysis. I make no 
claim to have presented an accurate description of the conflict between refugees and the welfare 
state. My aim has been to point out where a more critical approach would improve description 
and thereby alter action-guiding recommendations. I have maintained, following Gibney and 
Östbring, that there may be good reasons for wanting to protect the welfare state even in the 
face of the pressing needs of refugees, based on the welfare state as a social and political order 
and foundation of the personal moral experience. In the case of Sweden, there does seem to be 
some early warning signs that recent numbers of refugees have put strain on the universal 
welfare state.  
However, many of the reasons put forward in favour of protecting the welfare state over 
refugees rely on methodologically nationalist assumptions and ignore the power relations and 
ethnocentric biases the national welfare state reproduces. In the case of Sweden, nationalist 
discourses and norms institutionalised in the welfare state contribute to constructing refugees 
DV µWKH RWKHU¶ Ereeding intolerance and ethnocentric biases, which in turn may undermine 
social solidarity in diverse societies. To protect the welfare state, it is therefore paramount to 
address these institutional and discursive issues, for example by reforming welfare state 
institutions in more multicultural ways and promoting a public discourse that does not privilege 
the voices of subjects imagined as sedentary, ethnically homogenous and welfare-
contributing.16 Thus, a critical approach can accept that the welfare state may justify restricting 
asylum policies based on some of the reasons outlined here, but only if these do not increase 
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 Such reforms may include making public services more flexible to cater for different cultures, such as allowing 
or funding a variety of schools and care homes. This is particularly relevant for a universal welfare state like the 
Swedish one, where private alternatives are restricted. Kymlicka (2015: 12) has also made some suggestions to 
this end, though with more focus on citizenship.  
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existing biases and structures of dominance ± biases and structures that may in any case only 
deepen the conflict between generous asylum policies and welfare states.    
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